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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
vs. 112427 
LOUIS G. 'l'RYFONAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Louis G. Tryfonas, appeals the grand 
larceny conviction rendered against him. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
On February 11, 1970, appellant, Louis G. Try-
fonas, was convicted and adjudged guilty of the crime of 
grand larceny in the District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah, Honorable Allen B. Sorensen presiding. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
. Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for the 
crime of grand larceny. Alternatively appell t 
h ' an seeks to ave the case remanded for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Two United States Forest Service agents confront-
ed the appellant, Louis G. Tryfonas, on Forest Service 
land in Hobble Creek Canyon. Two beef halves were in 
the immediate vicinity of the appellant. The appellant 
was apprehended by these agents and subsequently 
charged with the crime of grand larceny. The appella~t 
was never alternatively charged with the crime of petty 
larceny, and during the trial no instructions regarding 
the lesser offense were given. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANT-
ING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
ON THE GROUND THAT THE STATE 
FAILED TO PROVE THE CRIME CHARGED 
BECAUSE NO PROOF WAS OFFERED AS TO 
THE VALUE OF THE BEEF ALLEGEDLY 
STOLEN, NOR 'VAS ANY PROOF OFFERED 
THAT THE BEEF FIT vVITHIN THE DEFI· 
NITION OF "COW" IN SECTION 76-38-4 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953). 
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Sedion 76-38-4 Utah Code Ann. ( 1953) provides: 
Grand larceny is committed in either of the fol-
lowing cases : 
(I) 'Vhen the property taken is of value ex-
ceeding $50. 
( 3) \Vhen the property taken is a ... cow. 
In this case the state could have attempted to prove 
grand larceny in either of two ways: that the value of 
the property was in excess of $50, or that the property 
taken was a "cow." While the original complaint con-
tained no reference to "cow" and charged the appellant 
with taking property "of a value in excess of $50," the 
state apparently abandoned this theory and attempted to 
establish grand larceny because of the nature of the 
property. The information had no reference to value, 
charging appellant with the theft of "one cow," and the 
state presented absolutely no evidence of the value of 
the property allegedly taken, even though it called a wit-
ness who could have competently evaluated the worth of 
the beef. ( T. 35.) 
Since no evidence of value was ever presented, this 
grand larceny conviction may only stand if the conduct 
of the appellant, as proved by the state, fell within the 
proscription of subsection ( 3) of section 76-38-4. In 
other words, to properly deny the appellant's motion to 
dismiss because the evidence was insufficient to establish 
the elements of the offense, the state had to prove that 
the appellant took a cow and not merely that he took two 
pieces of a cow's carcass. 
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The threshold problem here presented is: "When 
does a cow cease being a cow t It is initially . apparent 
that sect10n 76-38-4 contains no reference to the theft of 
beef. Therefore, it would seem that the cow must be 
taken alive to fall within the statute. The Utah Supreme 
Court, however, ruled in State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402 
131 P.2d 805 { 1942) that one means of "taking" a c011'. 
is to kill it and, accordingly, grand larceny may be per-
petrated by taking a dead cow if the one taking it also 
/,,·illed it. In Laub the court stated: 
Defendants in their brief contend that in order 
to constitute the crime of grand larceny, where 
the value of the meat does not exceed $50, the 
calf must be shown to have been alive during the 
entire course of the commission of the crime. This 
contention would appear correct if the person 
who took the carcass had had nothing to do with 
the killing of the animal. But where the animal is 
killed as a means of making the theft possible, the 
crime of grand larceny is complete just as much 
as if it had been loaded on a truck alive and taken 
away. This was a six month old calf. It was on 
the open range. If the person seeking to steal it 
shot it in order to catch it, the crime of grand Jar· 
ceny would be made out at the time it was shot 
and taken into possession. The killing .or shoot. 
ing was but the manner chosen to obtam posses· 
sion. State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131P.2d805, 
807 (1942). 
The significance of the Laub decision is that it does 
not change the obvious meaning of the statute. The ta~· 
ing of a cow still is restricted to the taking of a liv~ an'.· 
mal. Laub simply made it clear that a two-step takmg is 
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possible within the act-killing (caption) and transport-
ing ( asportation). This decision is compatible with the 
,reneral construction rule that criminal statutes must be 
0 
strictly construed. Laub clearly requires the one charged 
with the larcenous possession to be the one who killed the 
animal in order to sustain a grand larceny conviction. 
Any other standard would broaden the definition of 
"cow" in the act and force the court into drawing an 
artificial line somewhere between the taking of a cow on 
the open range which recently died a natural death and 
the taking of a steak in a grocery store. 
The Laub decision puts an additional burden on the 
state when it attempts to prove grand larceny solely be-
cause the property allegedly taken was two pieces of 
beef carcass. Assuming that the state can prove that the 
defendant took the beef, it must in addition prove that 
the defendant killed the cow from which the beef in his 
possession came. This is an element of the offense of 
grand larceny, just as proof of value in excess of $50 
would be, and must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
At first blush, it would appear that the state mis-
read the Laub case and concluded from it that proof that 
the carcass was once a cow is enough to bring the con-
duct within the ''taking of a cow" provision. The state 
made no systematic attempt to establish that the appel-
lant killed the cow in question. At the close of the state's 
case, the appellant moved for dismissal because reason-
able minds could not differ with the conclusion that the 
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state failed to prove the appellant killed the animal. (T 
37-38.) This motion was erroneously denied. · 
Examining the state's evidence in the light most 
favorable to it, only one piece of testimony had even a 
remote relationship to the issue of who killed the animal. 
That testimony was to the effect that the Forest Service 
agents, during the course of the arrest, shined a light into 
a nearby car and noticed a 45 to 50 caliber smooth bore 
percussion cap rifle in the back seat. (T. 22, 27.) That, 
however, is the sum total of the state's evidence on the 
issue of who killed the animal. No evidence was present-
ed as to how the cow was killed, let alone whether it had 
been killed by such a distinctive weapon as a smooth bort 
50 caliber rifle; no evidence was offered to prove the ob· 
served weapon had been, or even could be, fired; no evi· 
dence was offered that someone had head a shot; in fact, 
no evidence was even offered to prove the ownership of 
the car in which the rifle was spotted. 
If the state is to rest on the existence of a rifle in the 
back seat of somebody's car as evidence that the appel· 
lant killed the cow, then surely it must make some kind 
of an effort to link the rifle to both the appellant and the 
means of killing the animal. In this case there is not any 
evidence to support even a tenuous connection with 
either. We are, therefore, presented merely with the ex· 
istence of a rifle in the back of someone's car in the mid· 
die of an area where many people carry firearms. With· 
out so much as even testimony of a bullet hole in the car· 
cass, or evidence connecting the appellant to the owner· 
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ship or possession of the weapon, no light can make this 
evidence probative on the issue of who killed the cow. To 
infer that since there was a rifle and a dead cow, the cow 
was killed by a rifle, and then to infer that the appellant 
killed the cow is at best an inference on an inference, and 
more likely not even logically related. 
Since no evidence of value was ever placed before 
the finder of fact and since a reasonable man could not 
conclude the evidence sufficient to prove the appellant 
killed the cow, the crime of grand larceny was never 
established as to the appellant, and his conviction must 
be reversed. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE DEFI-
NITION OF THE WORD "COW" IN SECTION 
76-38-4 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953). 
The trial court's only instruction as to what consti-
tuted grand larceny was as follows: 
'Grand Larceny' is the felonious stealing ta~ing 
and carrying away of a heifer or cow, being the 
personal property of another. 
The appellant excepted to the instructions because 
they made no effort to clarify for the jury when a cow 
ceased to be a cow and when it became beef. As pointed 
out in Argument I, supra, the standard in Utah is clear. 
State 'V. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131P.2d805 (1942) states 
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that one must kill the cow in order to be liable f' or g1·and 
larceny under the above definition when a live co · w 1s not 
the subject of the theft. 
In this instance it was crucial to any consideration 
of the offense to know exactly what conduct was within 
meaning of "taking a cow." Here the evidence showed 
only two pieces of beef and not a live cow as the subject 
matter of a possible theft. Since the instructions did not 
state the Laub rule, the jury was permitted to infer that 
any taking of beef could fall within the definition of 
grand larceny. 
The jury should have been instructed to the effect 
that they could only find the appellant guilty of grand 
larceny if they were convinced that he had taken part in , 
the killing of the animal. Without this instruction there 
is nothing to prevent a jury from logically concluding 
the theft of a side of beef from a butcher shop to be grand 
larceny. 
No instruction was given regarding the value of the 
property taken as a means of finding grand larceny, and ' 
no instruction was given to the jury regarding the dif· 
ferent degrees of larceny. (T. 40.) The jury was left 
completely ignorant of the fact that the crime of petcy· 
larceny exists and that it was entirely possible that the 
appellant could .be guilty of the lesser offense an~ not 
the greater. Because of the improper instructions a Juror 
could have voted for a grand larceny conviction wher~he 
was convinced the appellant did in fact steal somethmg, 
and yet not convinced that he killed the animal. The 
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state's decision to not charge the lesser offense, combined 
with the improper instructions to the jury, makes it dan-
gerously likely that a man was convicted of a crime of 
greater degree than the jury really believed him guilty 
of. 
For the reasons stated in Argument I, supra, it is 
apparent that only the crime of petty larceny is at all 
supported by the evidence. If the grand larceny convic-
tion is not reversed outright because of the insufficiency 
of the evidence (see Argument I, supra), it must at least 
be remanded in order that the jury may properly con-
sider the lesser offense. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully con-
tended that the conviction against appellant should be 
reversed. Alternatively, it is contended that the case be 
remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
410 Empire Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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